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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Recent Decision:
Attempted Elimination of
School Segregation Through
Zoning Held Invalid
In the recent New York case of Balaban
v. Rubin,' the petitioners sought to annul a
determination made by the Board of Educa-
tion of the City of New York, which created
a district for a new junior high school. The
zone was planned primarily to create a
racially balanced student body at the school.
Petitioner's children would normally have
attended a primarily "white" neighborhood
school, but were scheduled to attend the
new school to constitute part of its white
population. Petitioners contended that the
exclusion of their children from the neigh-
borhood school violated the state Education
Law2 proscribing discrimination in public
education. In annulling the zoning proposal,
the New York Supreme Court held that the
plan, based to a material extent upon racial
factors, violated the spirit and intent of the
statute.
Since the historic opinions of the United
States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of
Educ.,4 declaring separate educational fa-
cilities for Negro and white children to be
"inherently unequal"4 and ordering their
dissolution with "all deliberate speed,'"5
federal and state courts have had difficulty
interpreting and implementing the decisions.
While clearly prohibiting government-cre-
1 40 Misc. 2d 249, 242 N.Y.S.2d 973 (Sup. Ct.
1963).
2 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3201. "No person shall be
refused admission into or be excluded from any
public school in the state of New York on ac-
count of race, creed, color or national origin."
Ibid.
3 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
4 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495
(1954).
5 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301
(1955).
ated or enforced segregation (de jure segre-
gation) the Court did not deal with the
problem of whether segregated education
resulting from fortuitous residential patterns
(de facto segregation) is within the purview
of the fourteenth amendment.6
Federal courts in their interpretation of
the Brown cases have agreed that there is a
constitutional duty on the part of state au-
thorities to end segregated education when
imposed by state action. However, they
have differed as to whether there is an af-
firmative duty to integrate public schools
when de facto segregation exists. A majority
of federal courts have indicated in dicta
that no affirmative duty to integrate schools
exists.' These courts have restricted the
Brown cases' application exclusively to
those situations where de jure segregation
exists. On the other hand, federal courts in
the Second Circuit have said that an af-
firmative duty to integrate may exist where
there is de facto segregation. The courts
reasoned that segregation in public educa-
tion, whether it be government-enforced,
or merely the result of unintended circum-
stances, is irreparably harmful to the psyche
of the segregated child.8 These cases view
6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in part:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."
E.g., Allen v. County School Bd., 249 F.2d 462,
465 (4th Cir. 1957); Boarders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d
268, 271 (5th Cir. 1957); Bell v. School City of
Gary, Indiana, 213 F. Supp. 819, 829 (N.D. Ind.
1963).
8 Branche v. Board of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150,
153 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); Taylor v. Board of Educ.,
191 F. Supp. 181, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (dictum),
afl'd, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 940 (1961).
the Brown rationale as standing for the pro-
position that it is the inherent inferiority of
the segregated education itself that is per se
violative of the fourteenth amendment, not
merely the physical separation of individu-
als because of their race. In Branche v.
Board of Educ., the court said:
The central constitutional fact is the in-
adequacy of segregated education. That it
is not coerced by direct action of an arm
of the state cannot, alone, be decisive of the
issue of deprivation of constitutional right
.... The educational system that is thus
compulsory and publicly afforded must deal
with the inadequacy arising from adventi-
tious segregation; it cannot accept and in-
durate segregation on the ground that it is
not coerced or planned but accepted.9
This position was again forcefully advanced
in Blocker v. Board of Educ. The court held
unconstitutional a school zone established
in 1929. At that time no problem of racial
imbalance existed. Since that time, how-
ever, rigid adherence to the same zoning
determination, coupled with changing resi-
dential patterns in the district, has resulted
in an almost complete separation of races
in the district's schools. The court called the
resulting situation "segregation by law-the
law of the School Board."1" Although there
was no evidence of an official policy seeking
to maintain segregation, the court held that
the existing racial imbalance in the district
was tantamount to segregation.
Federal courts have not often had the
opportunity of meeting the problem of de
facto segregation directly in that they have
interpreted various state actions as evidence
of an official segregation policy warranting
a desegregation order. In Taylor v. Board of
" Branche v. Board of Educ., supra note 8, at 153.
10 Blocker v. Board of Educ., No. 62-C-285,
E.D.N.Y., p. 48, Jan. 24, 1964.
10 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER 1964
Educ., 1 evidence that a school district was
gerrymandered to segregate Negroes was
considered sufficient grounds for a decree.
Racially segregated residential areas cre-
ated by state authorities which result in a
ghetto-like neighborhood school, 2 manipu-
lation of pupil transfer policies 3 and school
board pronouncements sanctioning segrega-
tion"' have also moved courts to issue dese-
gregation decrees. These decisions seem
consonant with the United States Supreme
Court's statement in Cooper v. Aaron' that
"State support of segregated schools through
any arrangement, management, funds, or
property cannot be squared with the [Four-
teenth] Amendment's command that no
State shall deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.""
The rationale expounded in the Brown
cases has been adopted in a number of states
as an important element in school zoning
policy. Dr. James E. Allen, Jr., Commis-
sioner of Education of the State of New
York, has been a leading proponent for the
establishment of racially integrated schools.
On June 19, 1963, Commissioner Allen or-
dered the school boards throughout the
state to submit plans showing the steps they
intended to take to eliminate racial imbal-
ance in their districts. 17 Commissioner Allen
recognized that in some areas of the state
it would be difficult to achieve racial bal-
ance, but he said: "This does not relieve
11 Supra note 8.
12 Holland v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 258 F.2d
730 (5th Cir. 1958).
13 Evans v. Buchanan, 172 F. Supp. 508 (D. Del.
1959).
14 Gibson v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 246 F.2d
913 (5th Cir. 1957).
15 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
36 Id. at 19.
17 N.Y. Times, June 19, 1963, p. 21, col. 4.
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school authorities of their responsibility for
doing everything within their power, con-
sistent with the principles of sound educa-
tion, to achieve an equitable balance." '
In response to the Commissioner's man-
date the New York City Board of Education
has renewed its efforts to provide equality
of educational opportunity for all.' To
achieve this, it has sought to provide the new
school districts with racially balanced stu-
dent populations. This is accomplished by
carefully drawing the school zone lines so
as to include both white and nonwhite
neighborhoods within the same zone. This
in essence was the plan proposed by the
Board of Education in the instant case.20
This plan, of necessity, considered the racial
factor in arriving at the zone finally pro-
posed. It should be emphasized that the
Board of Education has not abandoned the
consideration of other factors in formulat-
ing its zoning policy. Among these are
safety, minimization of travel distance, con-
tinuity of instruction, maximum utilization
of school space and accessibility of public
transportation. -2 1 However, the Board has
18 Id. at col. 3.
10 "The Supreme Court of the United States [in
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483] re-
minds us that modern psychological knowledge
indicates clearly that segregated, racially homo-
geneous schools damage the personality of minor-
ity group children. These schools decrease their
motivation and thus impair their ability to learn.
White children are also damaged. Public education
in a racially homogeneous setting is socially un-
realistic and blocks the attainment of the goals
of democratic education, whether this segregation
occurs by law or fact." Board of Education state-
ment as quoted in In the Matter of Skipwith, 14
Misc. 2d 325, 336-37, 180 N.Y.S.2d 852, 864
(Dom. Rel. Ct. 1958).
20 Balaban v. Rubin, 40 Misc. 2d 249, 250, 242
N.Y.S.2d 973, 975 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
"1Jansen, Zoning Plan of Superintendent of
Schools, City of New York, July 1957, 2 RACE
REL. L. REP. 1037, 1037-40 (1957). The New
now added the desirability of achieving ra-
cial balance in the schools to these zoning
considerations.
Commissioner Allen's order to the school
boards throughout the state did not sound
the death knell to the neighborhood school
concept as many people believed it would.
Recognizing the advantages of having chil-
dren attend local schools, the Commissioner
has stated his desire to preserve the neigh-
borhood school method of zoning whenever
possible, but not when it creates a segre-
gated school..2 2
In the instant case, the Court, in striking
down the proposed school zone, reasoned
that the consideration of race as a material
zoning factor was inconsonant with the
mandate of the Education Law. In his
opinion, the judge stated that "they [peti-
tioner's children] did, however, along with
all other children, of whatever race or color,
have the moral and statutory right not to be
excluded from any public school in the State
by reason of their race or color. That is the
plain command of the law.'1123 In the Court's
view, any plan creating a racial quota in the
new school would of necessity exclude some
children from attendance if their presence
would upset the proposed balance for that
school. Their exclusion, based primarily on
York State Commissioner of Education, James E.
Allen, Jr., has also said: "The [physical] safety of
the children, both white and Negro, is certainly
a greater consideration than the claim made by
these appellants that because there is a substan-
tial predominance of Negroes in the Northeast
School, that will mitigate against their educational
program." In the Matter of Bell, 77 N.Y. Dep't R.
37, 38 (N.Y. State Educ. Dep't 1956).
22 N.Y. Times, June 23, 1963, § IV, p. 7, col. 1.
23 Balaban v. Rubin, supra note 20, at 252, 242
N.Y.S.2d at 976. The same position was taken
recently in another supreme court case. In the
Matter of Vetere, Co. Clerk's No. 5217-63, Sup.
Ct. Albany Co., Dec. 31, 1963.
their race, was discrimination in violation
of the Education Law. Thus, respondent's
contention that the Board of Education may
consider racial and ethnic make-up in school
zoning, unless that policy results in the
establishment of a segregated school, was
considered untenable by the Court. The
respondent argued that the legislature in-
tended Section 3201 of the Education Law
to be an anti-discrimination statute designed
to prohibit the segregation of minority
groups in the public schools. The Court, in
rejecting this view stated: "whatever may
have been the factors which impelled its
enactment, the statute, by its very terms
proscribes exclusion from public schools by
reason of race, creed, color or national
origin. 12
4
Although materials indicative of the in-
tent of the legislature in enacting section
3201 are scarce, respondent's contention
seems well founded. The act which con-
tained section 3201 was entitled "An act to
tional facilities for Negro children in the
state of New York.....". The second sec-
tion of the same act repealed an earlier
statute allowing separate but equal educa-
tional facilities for Negro children in the
State of New York.2 6
The Court's determination will seriously
affect the Board of Education in its at-
tempts2 7 to achieve racial balance in the
4 Ibid.
25 LAWS OF N.Y 1900, ch. 492, §§ 1-2.
26 The separate but equal provision was enacted
again in 1909 as § 981 of the Education Law.
LAWS OF N.Y. 1909, ch. 16. It was finally re-
pealed in 1938, LAWS OF N.Y. 1938, ch. 134.
2 The Board's recently proposed joint zoning pro-
gram (the so-called Princeton Plan) may also be
open to objection as a result of the holding in
the instant case. This plan seeks to promote inte-
gration by pairing elementary schools having dis-
similar ethnic compositions which are located in
the same area. All pupils in the area would attend
10 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER 1964
city's schools. In completely disregarding the
rationale of the Brown decision concerning
the shortcomings of segregated education,
and in literally interpreting the Education
Law the Court seems to have rendered an
unfortunate decision. Consequently, the
Board of Education is deprived of one of its
most effective methods of achieving a
racially integrated school system. The Board
has not attempted to deprive any child of his
right to receive an education, nor has it
inconvenienced any child by its zoning pro-
posal. It has pledged that no child would
have to walk further to the new school than
he would have had to in order to get to his
neighborhood school.2s Now the Board of
Education will have to resort to costly and
less effective methods such as its Open En-
rollment Program. 9 This plan allows chil-
dren to transfer from schools which are
segregated because of residential patterns to
schools outside of their district which are
not segregated, if such schools are utilized
at less than ninety per cent of capacity
0
Thus, if the Board is forced to zone with-
out considering the desirability of racial
balance, it cannot help but maintain the
status quo of segregated education in a large
portion of the city.3 ' Even more important
one school for three years, then the other for the
remaining three years of the elementary school
curriculum. N.Y Times, Jan. 20, 1964, p. 1, col. 8.
28 N.Y. Times, June 15, 1963, p. 9, col. 6.
"29 Joint Statement by Mr. Charles H. Silver, Presi-
dent of the Board of Education, and Dr. John J.
Theobald, Superintendent of Schools (Aug. 31,
1960), 5 RACE REL. L. REP. 911 (1960).
30 The Board has recently said that such transfers
may be made mandatory to relieve overcrowding
and to insure that each child receives a full day of
classes. N.Y Times, Jan. 30, 1964, p. 17, col. 1.
31 N.Y. Times JLne 19, 1963, p. 21, col. 3. Sixty-
four of 588 elementary schools in New York City
have more than seventy per cent Negro and Puerto
Rican students. Thirty-one more have Negro and
Puerto Rican populations of between fifty and
sixty-nine per cent. Ibid.
 
